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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS
Susannah W. Pollvogt*
It is well established that animus can never constitute a legitimate state
interest for purposes of equal protection analysis. But neither precedent
nor scholarship has stated conclusively how animus is properly defined,
what counts as evidence of animus in any given case, or the precise
doctrinal significance of a finding of animus. The U.S. Supreme Court has
explicitly addressed the question of animus only a handful of times, and
these cases do not appear to be particularly congruent with one another, at
least on the surface. Further, while a number of scholars have discussed
animus in terms of moral philosophy, no one has attempted to articulate a
unified theory of animus as a matter of doctrine—particularly in the postLawrence era.
This Article systematically examines Supreme Court precedent to distill a
coherent standard for identifying the presence of animus in various forms of
state action. What emerges is that the animus analysis the Court actually
employs provides a more vigorous alternative to the thoroughly criticized
“tiers-of-scrutiny” framework, which has defined and limited the scope of
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. In short, the doctrine of
unconstitutional animus gives life to the strong anti-caste mandate of the
federal Equal Protection Clause. The time is ripe to understand the nature
of unconstitutional animus, as animus may well play a critical role in the
Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of different forms of prohibitions
against same-sex marriage.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to advance a comprehensive understanding
of unconstitutional animus as the U.S. Supreme Court uses the concept in
its federal equal protection jurisprudence. While the Article will ultimately
develop a broader definition of the term, as a point of reference, it is useful
to start with the Court’s initial articulation of animus as “a bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group.”1 The Court has held on numerous
occasions that where a law is based on such animus, it will not survive even
the most deferential level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.2
In short, animus, including hostility toward a particular social group, is
never a valid basis for legislation or other state action.
Thus, although the concept of unconstitutional animus rarely appears in
the Court’s decisions, it is powerful when it does. This is because under
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence, nearly all claims are subject
1. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). As discussed below, “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” is a species of animus, but does not
represent animus in its entirety. See infra notes 76, 113, 230 and accompanying text.
2. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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to deferential rational basis review. Under rational basis review, the
plaintiff almost invariably loses. Proving that a law is based on
unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way an equal protection
plaintiff can prevail under this deferential and increasingly common
standard. Further, a plaintiff can prevail by showing animus without having
to prove that she is a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. So while
the Court has discerned the presence of unconstitutional animus on only a
few occasions, when animus is found, it functions as a doctrinal silver
bullet.
For this and other reasons, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit relied
on the concept of unconstitutional animus in striking down California’s
Proposition 8 earlier this year in Perry v. Brown.3 First, the federal district
court decision that the Ninth Circuit was reviewing relied on the concept of
animus.4 Second, and more significantly, the concept of unconstitutional
animus cuts a short and direct path through the morass that is contemporary
equal protection jurisprudence. Relying on animus allowed the Ninth
Circuit to avoid difficult and unpleasant doctrinal questions.5 Further, the
underlying facts in Perry actually presented an easy case for identifying
unconstitutional animus and striking the law on that basis—although the
Ninth Circuit did not take the easy route to its conclusion. Specifically,
3. 671 F.3d 1052, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144 (U.S. July 30, 2012) (noting that
Proposition 8 gave rise to an inference “that the disadvantage imposed [on plaintiffs was]
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 633–34 (1996))); see also id. at 1096. In brief, Proposition 8 was a law enacted by
popular referendum in the State of California that withdrew from same-sex couples the right
to marry—a right that had previously been granted to them by virtue of the California
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding
that marriage must be made available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples).
4. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010):
Many of the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing more than a
fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples. Those interests that are
legitimate are unrelated to the classification drawn by Proposition 8 . . . . In the
absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents’ case is an inference,
amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 8 was premised on the
belief that same-sex couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples.
See also id. (“Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus
towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman
is inherently better than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not a
proper basis on which to legislate.”).
5. Namely, whether: (1) bans on same-sex marriage discriminate on the basis of sex;
(2) bans on same-sex marriage discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation; (3) sexual
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification; and/or (4) bans on same-sex marriage
implicate the recognized fundamental right to marriage, such that the Court’s holding in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), would control. If any of these questions were
answered in the affirmative, the court would have been obligated to apply some form of
heightened scrutiny to Proposition 8. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985) (noting that suspect classifications receive strict scrutiny); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (noting that laws implicating fundamental rights are subject to
strict scrutiny).
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precedent clearly demonstrates that the Supreme Court is willing to find
that a law violates the Equal Protection Clause where statements
surrounding the enactment of the law indicate that it was motivated by
private bias against an unpopular group. Such evidence was in ample
supply in Perry, where proponents of Proposition 8 had a lengthy record of
antigay sentiments meant to stir support for the measure. But for reasons
this Article will explore later, the Ninth Circuit did not make this evidence
the centerpiece of its analysis.6
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct outcome in Perry and
hung its analysis on the correct doctrinal hook: unconstitutional animus.
But the court did not draw on the full history of the doctrine in reaching its
conclusion. Rather, it offered a rather cabined view of animus, informed
largely by the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans.7 While
Romer is the most recent of the Court’s recognized animus decisions, it is
also the least helpful and most compromised.
Romer is not a model of doctrinal clarity,8 and when one looks at the
other cases addressing unconstitutional animus, the picture does not
necessarily become clearer.9 Because while the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the federal Equal Protection Clause does not permit state action
based on animus toward a particular social group,10 the Court has not
clearly defined the concept of animus, stated what exactly counts as
evidence of animus, or identified the doctrinal significance of finding the
presence of animus in any given case. Indeed, the Court has addressed the
concept of animus only a handful of times, and these cases do not appear to
be particularly congruent with one another—at least at first blush. This
Article contends that there is a single, unifying doctrinal principle running
through the Supreme Court’s animus cases, but it takes some work to
identify that principle.

6. See infra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
7. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it lacked a rational basis independent of unconstitutional animus).
8. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J 89, 90–91 (1997) (compiling various, divergent interpretations of Romer v. Evans);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1996)
(noting that one of the virtues of the Romer decision was that it left certain controversial
issues undecided).
9. See Nan Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111 (2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-111.pdf
(characterizing the concept of animus as “highly contested ground”).
10. See id. at 632 (holding Amendment 2 unconstitutional because it “seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship
to legitimate state interests”); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (noting that the desire to
harm persons with cognitive disabilities is not a legitimate state interest); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (noting that the law may not directly or indirectly give effect to
personal biases); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (noting that
the desire to harm a politically unpopular group such as hippies is not a legitimate public
interest).
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Further, while there was a flurry of commentary on animus immediately
following the Court’s decision in Romer, there has not been an effort to
comprehensively reassess the doctrine of unconstitutional animus since the
Court decided Lawrence v. Texas11 in 2003. And indeed, much of the
scholarly commentary on animus post-Romer was understandably
preoccupied with the question Justice Scalia raised forcefully in his dissent:
whether moral disapproval and unconstitutional animus were really the
same thing.12 But after Lawrence, it is clear that bare moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct or homosexual identity is not a valid basis for a law.13
Because the doctrine of unconstitutional animus goes well beyond
Romer, this Article seeks to set forth the full scope of the Court’s animus
jurisprudence in the context of claims brought under the federal Equal
Protection Clause. This inquiry is timely because a full understanding of
unconstitutional animus may be necessary for the Supreme Court’s review
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry if the Court accepts certiorari.
Further, the concept of animus may also be central to other same-sex
marriage cases. As of this writing, the Court has not yet decided whether to
grant certiorari review in Perry or any of the pending challenges to the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). If the Court issues certiorari in
one or more of these cases this term, the issue of animus will be before it
sooner rather than later. But the Court may well deny certiorari for now to
allow further development of the law in the lower courts. In this case, the
lower courts will have to grapple with the animus doctrine in the absence of
further guidance from the Supreme Court, creating a more elaborate—and
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding Texas anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional).
12. See Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v.
Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833 (1998) (asking whether moral disapproval is a constitutionally
adequate state interest); Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and
the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 492‒500 (1997) (describing the
Supreme Court’s use of animus in its analysis in Romer, Moreno, and Cleburne, and
concluding that the underlying rationale is that laws will be invalidated if they are based on
or reflective of the view that some people are intrinsically worth less than others); S.I.
Strong, Justice Scalia as a Modern Lord Devlin: Animus and Civil Burdens in Romer v.
Evans, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining theoretical basis for permitting moral
disapproval as a basis for law); see also Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious
Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 90–91 (1997) (cataloging theories of animus
disseminated in the wake of the Romer decision).
13. Indeed, Justice Scalia vigorously argued in his dissent in Romer that Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), stood for precisely this proposition, that laws could and
should express bare moral disapproval of otherwise innocuous conduct and bare moral
disapproval of groups associated with that conduct:
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the
Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago . . .
and places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias. Whether it is or not is
precisely the cultural debate that gave rise to the Colorado constitutional
amendment (and to the preferential laws against which the amendment was
directed).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186).
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possibly more confusing—backdrop for the Court’s ultimate resolution of
the animus doctrine.
Now that Lawrence has resolved the doctrinal ambiguity that plagued
Romer, and marriage equality litigation is looming on the horizon of the
Supreme Court’s docket, it is the right time to revisit unconstitutional
animus—the conceptual linchpin of the Romer decision. To help further
understand the doctrine of unconstitutional animus in the post-Lawrence
world, Part I of this Article explains the significance of animus in the larger
context of trends in contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. Part II
closely examines decisions of the Supreme Court that rely on the concept of
animus. Part III identifies the common themes running through these
somewhat disparate decisions, and presents an overarching definition for
unconstitutional animus, a taxonomy of the types of evidence that can be
used to establish the existence of animus, and an internally consistent
account of the doctrinal significance of a finding of animus. Part IV
critically examines the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of animus in Perry
against the backdrop this Article develops.
I. THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMUS
Animus can be considered the sleeper agent of the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence: it rarely makes an appearance—but when it does,
it swiftly and effectively accomplishes its mission.
One reason animus is important is because there is good reason to believe
it may play a central role in the Court’s decision(s) on marriage equality.
But there are other reasons to be interested in the Court’s understanding of
animus outside of the role the doctrine may play in same-sex marriage
litigation. First, demonstrating that a law is based on unconstitutional
animus is virtually the only way a plaintiff is successful under deferential
rational basis review. This matters, in turn, because most contemporary
equal protection claims will receive rational basis review rather than any
form of heightened scrutiny. Second, while animus has played its largest
role in rational-basis cases, it also is relevant to cases where heightened
scrutiny is applied. This is because the doctrine of unconstitutional animus
expresses core values of the federal Equal Protection Clause that transcend
the Court’s rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework.
A. The Tiers-of-Scrutiny Framework
The doctrinal significance of animus has everything to do with the ways
in which contemporary equal protection analysis has evolved. Thus, a brief
history of the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework for equal protection cases
provides necessary context for understanding the doctrinal significance of
animus. In the beginning, there was only one standard of judicial scrutiny
in equal protection cases: a rule of reason. For example, the Court applied
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a “reasonableness” test in the early (and since reviled) case of Plessy v.
Ferguson.14 In deciding whether mandatory racial segregation of passenger
train cars violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court determined that
laws relying on racial classifications need only be “reasonable” regulations
within the state’s police power.15 The reasonableness inquiry, in turn, was
essentially backward-looking:
“In determining the question of
reasonableness [the legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to
the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and
good order.”16 Viewed in this light, race segregation was eminently—
indeed, undeniably—“reasonable.”17
As the Plessy decision aptly demonstrates, relying on a rule of reason—
“with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people”18—to assess the fairness of a particular mode of discrimination is
inherently problematic. This is because a standard based on reasonableness,
“common knowledge,” or otherwise by reference to subjective,
contemporary standards of fairness will be ineffective at rooting out
contemporary prejudices, which, by definition, conform with contemporary
custom and reason. While we hope that governmental decision makers,
including judges, can rise above commonly held biases, there is good
reason to think they cannot.19
But rather than developing a mechanism to carefully root out biased
thinking, the Court instead developed a short cut through critical thought.
In essence, the Court created categories of cases in which there was
presumptive concern that unfair prejudice was afoot. In this subset of
cases, the Court would apply heightened judicial scrutiny. The framework
that ultimately evolved, through fits and starts, required race-based laws to
survive “searching judicial scrutiny,”20 under which the state must show
that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
14. 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (holding racially segregated train cars constitutional under the “separate but equal”
doctrine).
15. See id. (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion
on the part of the legislature.”).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 550–51.
18. Id. at 550.
19. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Americans share a
common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a
dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative
feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has
influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our
racism.”).
20. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (noting that
“searching judicial scrutiny” is reserved for laws involving suspect classifications).
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interest.21 This standard is famously difficult to meet, and indeed, outside
of laws meant to ameliorate the effects of race discrimination,22 one no
longer sees laws relying on explicit (i.e., facial) race classifications.23
There are several justifications for departing from the deference and
presumption of constitutionality in race-based cases. First, the explicit,
historical purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to eliminate postslavery race discrimination.24 While the Court determined that the
provision did not empower Congress to enact broad antidiscrimination
legislation,25 it did empower the courts to patrol state laws for
impermissible racial bias.26 Thus, the default of extreme judicial deference
to state legislatures based on a commitment to separation of powers was not
required where the Constitution itself mandated a departure from this
standard. Notably, because the Court applies strict scrutiny to all racebased classifications,27 not just those related to American slavery, the
21. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
(reviewing constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policy aimed at increasing
educational diversity).
23. Instead, race-based equal protection jurisprudence has largely been displaced onto
the decidedly more treacherous terrain of discriminatory impact cases. In these cases, the
challenged law does not contain a facial race classification, but is claimed to have a
discriminatory impact along racial lines. The discriminatory racial impact is insufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny; rather, the plaintiff must prove that the law was enacted with
discriminatory intent—a notoriously difficult showing. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059,
1081–83 (2011) (noting that the limited types of evidence available to establish
discriminatory intent, along with the tiers of scrutiny, leave courts severely limited in their
ability to deal with racial inequalities).
24. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 81 (1872) (asserting that
the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was the “firm establishment of that freedom [of
the black race], and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him” and
declaring that the “evil to be remedied” by promulgation of the Equal Protection Clause was
that evil caused by those laws “which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against
[emancipated slaves] as a class”).
25. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883) (“[T]he legislation which
Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the
citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the Amendment,
they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may
commit or take, and which, by the Amendment, they are prohibited from committing or
taking.”).
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1967) (noting that, even where subject
matter of legislation falls within a state’s police powers, the courts will still review the
legislation for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause).
27. The Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), recognized the
danger of racial antagonism underlying all racial classifications:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that
[they are] unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
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justification for elevated scrutiny in such cases goes beyond its historical
grounding. The application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications reflects
a broader consensus that one’s race is never relevant to one’s ability to
participate in society, such that race is almost never a valid subject of
legislative action.28
From this initial departure, the Court eventually developed an elaborate
tiers-of-scrutiny framework for determining the proper level of judicial
review in any given case. The first instance where departure from rational
basis review is permitted is that described above—where a law relies on a
problematic classification.
Race is the paradigmatic problematic
classification, and has been designated by the Court—along with alienage
and national origin—as a “suspect classification.” The traits defining these
classifications are presumptively irrelevant to lawmaking.
These
classifications are “suspect” in the sense that we are suspicious when a law
relies on them, because they tend to represent misplaced prejudice or
antipathy toward the named group rather than a basis for sound legislative
judgment.29 Therefore, laws or other state action relying on suspect
classifications will be subject to strict scrutiny, to make certain that
decision-makers do not unconsciously succumb to the “reasonableness” of
racial prejudice.
Intermediate scrutiny applies to laws relying on the two so-called “quasisuspect classifications”: gender and illegitimacy.30 The notion here is that
while race, for example, is almost never a valid basis for legislation, gender
is generally not a valid basis—but there are exceptions, due to the “real
differences” between men and women.31 Courts must be careful that
gender classifications are not based on unfair prejudice, but such
Id. at 216.
28. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“[T]wo members of this Court have already stated
that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a
person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.’”) (quoting McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring)). Contra
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (determining that race was relevant to government regulation of public
transportation, education, marriage, and general “preservation of the public peace and good
order”).
29. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (stating that suspect
classifications are “more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than
legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective”). For further explanation, see
Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 38–42 (2010).
30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985). In
conjunction with the decisions identifying suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, the
Court has developed an elaborate analysis for determining whether any particular
classification falls into one of these categories. Suffice it to say that the Court went through
a period of expanding the number of recognized suspect and quasi-suspect classifications,
but has declined to do so since 1977. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 756–57 (2011).
31. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical differences between
men and women, however, are enduring . . . .”).
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classifications may be permissible under the right circumstances. Laws
relying on quasi-suspect classifications provoke intermediate scrutiny,
which places the burden on the state to prove that the law is justified by an
“important” governmental interest and that the classification is
“substantially related” to advancing that interest.32
The second instance where the Court will depart from rational basis
review is where a law relies on any classifications of persons to regulate
access to a fundamental right.33 In such cases, strict scrutiny applies
regardless of whether the classification at issue is suspect or not—elevated
scrutiny is triggered by the nature of the right at issue rather than the nature
of the classification. The idea here is that, regardless of whether the group
discriminated against has been historically disadvantaged or marginalized,
there are certain rights that are so important to our lives in a free society
that access to these rights should not be regulated on a differential basis.
In contemporary equal protection jurisprudence, rational basis review
remains as the lowest level of judicial scrutiny and is the default standard.
Under this level of scrutiny, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
absence of any legitimate governmental interest served by the law.34
Further, the law’s means need only be rationally related to accomplishing
that end—the fact that a classification is over- or underinclusive is not a
winning argument under rational basis review.35 Courts apply rational basis
review to a range of cases, from those involving discrimination between
economic interests36 to those involving discrimination on the basis of some
trait that, in contrast to race, is seen as presumptively relevant to
performance in society and is therefore a valid basis for legislation.37
Thus, the Court’s interpretations of history, social reality, and our values
as a society determine which types of discrimination are of concern and
32. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
33. See id. at 440.
34. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (Under rational basis review, “[a]
statute is presumed constitutional, and ‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it’” (second alteration
in original) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))).
35. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 55 (“But this does not doom a statute under rational
basis review; over-inclusive and under-inclusive legislation is perfectly acceptable, indeed
quite common.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICS 668–69, 721–28 (3d ed. 2006).
36. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003) (subjecting
an Iowa law to rational basis review, where the law distinguished for tax purposes among
revenues obtained within the State by two enterprises conducting business in the State).
37. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (noting that age has not been recognized as a suspect
classification because the aged had not been “subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities” (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976))); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 165–67 (2011) (noting that courts consider the
relevancy of a group’s defining characteristic in terms of determining whether the
differentiating trait bears a relation to the individual’s ability to participate and contribute to
society).
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which are not. And these various levels of concern are then expressed in
the deep structures of the equal protection doctrine.
Scholars have criticized the rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework as a barrier
rather than facilitator of antidiscrimination imperatives.38 First, the tiers-ofscrutiny framework operates as an outcome matrix,39 thereby shortcircuiting rather than deepening substantive inquiry into the fairness of any
particular form of discrimination.40 And indeed, one sees a pattern in equal
protection decisions where much time and attention is paid to determining
the applicable level of judicial scrutiny; once this question is answered, the
analysis proceeds succinctly and superficially. If the Court rejects
arguments that the plaintiff is a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
or that the law interferes with a fundamental right, it will settle on rational
basis review and the plaintiff will lose.41 But if the Court is persuaded of
either of these two prerequisites, it will apply heightened scrutiny and likely
strike the challenged law.
The difficulty of succeeding under rational basis review is exacerbated by
the fact that the vast majority of contemporary equal protection cases are
assessed under this deferential standard. Access to heightened scrutiny is
generally foreclosed, as the Court has expressed great reluctance to
acknowledge new suspect classifications, quasi-suspect classifications, or
fundamental rights.42
Kenji Yoshino argues persuasively that this
reluctance is a response to “pluralism anxiety”—the notion that if the Court
takes the notion of suspect classifications seriously, it will be forced to
recognize “too many groups.”43
In addition, the Court has determined that a law having a discriminatory
impact, but devoid of any facial classification, will be subject only to
rational basis review, regardless of the group affected by the discrimination.
The only way to achieve a higher level of scrutiny is to make the
exceptionally difficult showing of discriminatory intent. Further, while the
Court initially permitted plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose in a
38. See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1080 (describing manner in
which structure of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence undermines rather than
advances antisubordination goals); see also Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection
Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional
Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342–43 (2006) (describing critiques of the tiersof-scrutiny framework).
39. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1079 (referencing Professor Gerald
Gunther’s observation that strict scrutiny was “strict in theory and fatal in fact”).
40. See id. (“These levels of scrutiny allow the Court to justify rulings in favor of the
government with little analysis of the competing constitutional interests.”).
41. See id. (“This framework creates a strong presumption in favor of rationality review:
only in exceptional circumstances—if there is a fundamental right or suspect classification—
does the Court apply heightened scrutiny.”).
42. See Yoshino, supra note 30, at 757 (noting that the Supreme Court has not accorded
heightened scrutiny to any new group based on suspect classification since 1977 and arguing
that “[a]t least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence, this canon has closed”).
43. See id. at 748.
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number of ways,44 the Court subsequently limited the category by
ratcheting up the requirement for a showing of discriminatory purpose—
requiring a showing that the decision maker chose a particular course of
action at least in part because of its anticipated discriminatory impact.45
Due to the difficulty of making this showing, an additional swath of equal
protection cases has been channeled into rational basis review.46
Because the categories of suspect class, quasi-suspect class, and
fundamental right are seemingly closed and heightened scrutiny is virtually
inaccessible absent a facial classification, the vast majority of equal
protection claims will be subject only to rational basis review. Combine
this with the fact that rational basis review is an exceptionally deferential—
some would say toothless—standard, and judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause is left gutted.
This is where the doctrine of
unconstitutional animus comes in. A showing of animus represents one of
the few viable arrows in a plaintiff’s quiver under these circumstances,
which makes it an important subject of inquiry.
B. Animus and Rational Basis Review
As a matter of historical fact, proving that a law is based on
unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way for a plaintiff to defeat
deferential rational basis review. When the Court subjects a claim to
rational basis review, it is overwhelmingly probable that the plaintiff will
lose.47 Indeed, the number of rational basis cases in which plaintiffs have
prevailed is so small that these cases have become an object of study in and
of themselves. Gerald Gunther famously took up this topic in his 1972
Harvard Law Review article reviewing the cases decided in the Court’s
1971 term.48 Gunther initially identified seven equal protection cases
decided under rational basis review in which the plaintiff prevailed. He
attributed the plaintiffs’ victories in these cases to the evolution of a new,
yet-unacknowledged level of scrutiny: rational basis with “bite.”49
Specifically, Gunther observed that the court appeared to have increased the
rigor with which it applied the tailoring prong of rational basis review. All
levels of scrutiny have a government-interest prong (does the law purport to
serve a legitimate/important/compelling government interest) and a
tailoring prong (is the classification employed by the law sufficiently
related to advancing the purported government interest). Gunther predicted
44. See id. at 764.
45. Pers. Admin’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1081 (discussing one such case).
47. See id. at 1076 (stating that under rational basis review, “the odds are overwhelming
that the government will prevail”); Yoshino, supra note 30, at 759–60 (describing lenity of
rational basis review).
48. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
49. See id. at 21–22.
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that equal protection jurisprudence would develop to involve less scrutiny
of substantive legislative ends (sufficiency of the government’s interest)
and more scrutiny of legislative means (sufficiency of tailoring).50
But as subsequent commentators noted, the “rational basis with bite”
standard did not have much in the way of legs.51 A number of the cases
Gunther identified as rational basis cases ended up actually being protoheightened scrutiny cases.52 Others appeared to be aberrations.53 As
discussed below, the remainder can be explained by an alternative theory:
that the Court found that the laws in those cases were based on
unconstitutional animus.54
Robert Farrell’s 1999 survey of rational basis rulings in favor of plaintiffs
found that Gunther’s theory that the Court had developed a new “rational
basis with bite” standard had not stood the test of time. Between 1971 and
1999, “the Court decided 110 cases in which it used minimal scrutiny,” of
which “plaintiffs prevailed in only ten.”55 Upon review, Farrell concluded
that these cases could not be explained by a “rational basis with bite”
standard, or by a number of other theories. But at least half of these—U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,56 Plyler v. Doe,57 Zobel v.

50. Id. at 20–30.
51. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373–82 (1999).
52. Id. at 362–65.
53. See id. at 369–70. One of the seven cases dropped out because it was not an equal
protection case. Id. at 361. Three additional cases were later conceptually subsumed within
heightened scrutiny because they dealt with gender and illegitimacy. Id. at 370–72. James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972)—a case that touched on the right to counsel—invoked
language strikingly similar to the Court’s 1996 animus-based decision in Romer. In
particular, the Strange Court noted that the challenged law “strips from indigent defendants
the array of protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment debtors” and
emphasized the principle “that the Equal Protection Clause ‘imposes a requirement of some
rationality in the nature of the class singled out.’” See Strange, 407 U.S. at 135, 140 (1972)
(emphasis added) (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1966)). Gunther hailed
Strange as another example of the Court focusing on means (sufficiency of tailoring) as
opposed to ends (sufficiency of the governmental interest). See Gunther, supra note 48, at
33. But the Strange Court was concerned about the manner in which the statute set apart and
disadvantaged the targeted class: “The statute before us embodies elements of punitiveness
and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law.”
Strange, 407 U.S. at 142. Thus, the linchpin to that decision could be interpreted as the
presence of impermissible animus rather than application of a heightened form of rational
basis review.
The final pair of Gunther’s cases, involving civil commitment procedures, did
indeed seem to bear the indicia of a new, more vigorous form of rational basis review:
intolerance of over- and underinclusiveness; refusal to hypothesize legitimate purposes;
placing the burden on the state to present evidence of an “affirmative relation between means
and ends.” See Gunther, supra note 48, at 47. But, as is apparent now, this standard did not
become the default test for future rational basis cases.
54. See Gunther, supra note 48, at 27–30.
55. See Farrell, supra note 51, at 370.
56. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
57. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Williams,58 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,59 and Romer—are,
as argued below, properly categorized as animus cases. This suggests,
contrary to Gunther’s assertion, that the real concern in many of these cases
was with ends and not means—that insufficient tailoring was merely
symptomatic of an improper purpose: animus.
C. Animus and Heightened Scrutiny
Animus is also relevant in cases of heightened scrutiny. For example, the
Supreme Court clearly relied on animus—defined as private bias—in
Palmore v. Sidoti,60 a case involving race classifications that was subject to
strict scrutiny review. Similarly, as discussed at length below, both Loving
v. Virginia61 and Brown v. Board of Education62 may properly be
understood as cases where the Court invalidated state action because it
expressed and enforced private bias.
Because laws based on animus cannot survive rational basis review, by
definition neither can they survive intermediate or strict scrutiny. As a
concept that cuts across the tiers-of-scrutiny framework, the prohibition
against basing laws in animus represents the broader and more universal
commitments of the Equal Protection Clause—namely, a fundamental anticaste orientation that applies with equal concern to all discrimination
against social groups, regardless of whether they have been recognized as
suspect classifications.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANIMUS JURISPRUDENCE
Animus is crucial to equal protection jurisprudence—but what exactly is
animus, what counts as evidence of animus, and how does it function
doctrinally? Recognized animus cases are few in number. Only four
decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly rely on language that can be
traced with certainty to the concept of unconstitutional animus.63
Nonetheless, these cases set the foundation for a coherent doctrine. In
addition, the themes developed in these cases are further elaborated upon in
58. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
59. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
60. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
61. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. This Article addresses animus in the context of the Supreme Court’s decisions under
the federal Equal Protection Clause, and does not look at animus as discussed in distinct
doctrinal contexts, such as actions brought under Section 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (“‘The object of the amendment is . . .
to confine the authority of this law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the
equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect
of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens’ rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this
section.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST
SESS. 478 (1871))).
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another set of cases that, while not explicitly referring to animus, share a
conceptual heritage.
A. Recognized Animus Cases
The Court has explicitly relied on the concept of unconstitutional animus
in only four cases.64 Each of these cases presents a different facet of the
doctrine.
1. Animus As Desire to Harm: U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
The first of the Court’s recognized animus cases is the 1972 decision in
Moreno. At issue in that case was a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp
Act of 1964, which withdrew food stamp benefits if any individual living in
a household was unrelated to the other residents.65 This was considered an
equal protection problem because, by imposing this restriction, the law
“create[d] two classes of persons for food stamp purposes: one . . .
composed of those individuals who live in households all of whose
members are related to one another, and the other [consisting] of those
individuals who live in households containing one or more members who
are unrelated to the rest.”66 Prior to the 1971 amendment, the Act drew no
such distinction.67 Rather, the original language specifically defined a
household as “‘a group of related or non-related individuals.’”68
While the amendment was intended to exclude a particular reviled social
group—“hippies”—the plaintiffs who challenged the law were not
themselves hippies, but instead represented the collateral damage resulting
from the poorly drawn classification. For instance, one plaintiff was a fiftysix-year old diabetic man living with an unrelated woman and her three
children in order to reduce expenses and receive medical care.69 Another
plaintiff, who lived with her three children, took in an unrelated young
woman to help the young woman with her emotional difficulties.70 Yet
another pair of unrelated women lived together in order to afford a home in
a neighborhood where one’s deaf daughter would be able to attend a school
providing special instruction for the deaf.71

64. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
65. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 530 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525,
78 Stat. 703, 703–09 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036a (2006 & Supp. V
2011))).
69. Id. at 531.
70. Id. at 532.
71. Id.
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Because the law involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right,
the Court applied rational basis review.72 As discussed above, rational
basis review, like the other tiers of scrutiny, embodies a two-part test: first,
the law must serve some legitimate state interest; second, the classification
must be rationally related to that interest.73 Thus, the challenged law must
survive both a sufficiency-of-the-state-interest prong (is the state interest
legitimate?) and a sufficiency-of-tailoring prong (is the classification
rationally related to that interest?).
The Moreno Court determined that the goal of excluding hippies from
food stamp benefits failed both prongs. Regarding the sufficiency of the
state interest, the Court first assessed the narrow congressional aim in
passing the amendment, which the Court determined to be explicitly based
on impermissible animus.74 Indeed, Congress did not disguise its motives.
The legislative record revealed that Congress altered the definition of
“household” to “prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from
participating in the food stamp program.”75 The Court concluded that
excluding hippies from food stamp benefits was not a legitimate
governmental interest: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”76 A “purpose to discriminate
against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some
independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971
amendment.”77
The Moreno Court also concluded that the amendment failed the tailoring
prong of rational basis review. The Court first considered what other
legitimate state interests the amendment might serve, focusing on the
government’s general interest in the Food Stamp Act: “to safeguard the
health and well-being of the Nation’s population and raise levels of
nutrition among low-income households.”78 Increasing food security
among the poor was clearly a legitimate state interest, but the Court
72. Id. at 533.
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. See id. at 534–35.
75. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.);
116 CONG. REC. 44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
76. Id. (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at 534–35.
78. Id. at 533. The Act was also geared toward strengthening the agricultural economy
by better distributing agricultural products. See id. at 533–34 (“The Congress further finds
that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of
nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances
and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing
and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is
herein authorized which will permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally
adequate diet through normal channels of trade.” (quoting Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703, 703–09 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036a (2006 &
Supp. V 2011))).
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concluded that “[t]he challenged statutory classification (households of
related persons versus households containing one or more unrelated
persons) is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act.”79
Specifically, the relatedness or lack of relatedness between different
members of a household did not affect their nutritional needs.80 Thus, there
was no affirmative connection between the trait that defined the classified
group and the group’s interest in the governmental benefit being distributed,
or, indeed, the government’s interest in offering the benefits in the first
place.
The government had also offered fraud prevention as a legitimate
governmental interest independent of the bare desire to discriminate against
hippies.81 But while the Court determined that this interest was also
legitimate, it ultimately concluded that the relatedness classification was so
poorly tailored to accomplishing the antifraud goal that the goal itself could
not be credited.82 Again, there was no affirmative reason to think that this
group was more prone to commit fraud than any other.
Thus, Moreno set the pattern for the one-two punch of animus analysis.
First, the Court discerned affirmative evidence of a “desire to harm” a
specific social group.83 This goal—discrimination for the sake of
discrimination—was an impermissible function of the law.84 Second, the
Court examined the other purported state interests, requiring that the trait
that defined the classification be affirmatively related to the
accomplishment of those interests.85 The second step is a heightened,
means-oriented analysis of the type that Gunther described in setting forth
the standard for rational basis with bite.86 But it appears that this more
79. Id. at 534.
80. Id. (“As the District Court recognized, ‘[t]he relationships among persons
constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their
abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their
personal nutritional requirements.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972))).
81. See id. at 535.
82. Id. at 536–37 (noting that “the challenged classification simply does not operate so
as rationally to further the prevention of fraud,” and that “[t]he existence of [more precise
antifraud] provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971
amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses”).
83. Id. at 534.
84. See id. at 534–35; supra note 74 and accompanying text.
85. See id. at 534 (“As the District Court recognized, ‘[t]he relationships among persons
constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their
abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their
personal nutritional requirements.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972))).
86. Under the traditional rational basis standard, if it was possible that at least some
unrelated households were committing fraud, the fact that the classification was both underand overinclusive (i.e., it failed to capture others who might be committing fraud and
captured many who were not committing fraud—like the sympathetic plaintiffs in the case)
would not defeat the law. See Gunther, supra note 48, at 21–22. Indeed, the notions of
under- and overinclusiveness have no place in a rational basis review analysis, but should be
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vigorous examination was prompted by the presence of affirmative
evidence of animus in the legislative history. In this case, the presence of
animus poisons the well, discrediting other explanations as mere pretext for
unconstitutional discrimination.
On a broader level, the tailoring of the amendment was also problematic
because it used status as a proxy for conduct. The Moreno Court
considered the classification irrational because it was based on “wholly
unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between ‘related’
and ‘unrelated’ households.”87 That is, the law used the status of
relatedness as a proxy for the conduct of fraud. The Court noted that there
were other portions of the Food Stamp Act that were directly targeted at
preventing fraud—unlike the challenged provision, which sought to do so
indirectly by using relatedness as an extremely imprecise proxy for
propensity to commit fraud.88 The Court also noted that “[t]he existence of
these [other antifraud] provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt upon
the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been
intended to prevent those very same abuses.”89
Further doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the purported antifraud goal
because the amendment was not congruent with the larger goals of the Act.
Not only did the amendment do nothing to further the purported
governmental interest in preventing fraud, it actually thwarted the primary
purpose of the Act: providing food security to those in need.90 Those who
fraudulently claimed financial need could easily evade the exclusion by not
cohabiting. Thus, the victims of the exclusion would be the truly destitute,
who had no choice but to share living expenses with others.91
Thus, where the challenged law relied on a status-based classification,
and where there was direct evidence of private bias toward a specific social
group, the Court required an affirmative connection between the trait
defining the classification (relatedness) and either the individual’s need for
the subject benefits (food security) or the government’s interest in
regulating those benefits (providing food security; preventing fraud). This
is not necessarily equivalent to shifting the burden onto the government, but
it does require the Court be able to identify and articulate this connection.
From another perspective, it gives plaintiffs the opportunity to prove a
positive—the presence of unconstitutional animus—as opposed to a
negative—the lack of any conceivable rational basis for a law. If there is no
reserved for the close tailoring requirements of heightened scrutiny. See Sunstein, supra note
8, at 55 (“But [under- and overinclusiveness] do[] not doom a statute under rational basis
review; [they are] perfectly acceptable, indeed quite common.”). Thus, it is perfectly
permissible for legislatures to rely on under- or overinclusive classifications; this is a far cry
from the classification being irrational.
87. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.
88. See id. at 536.
89. Id. at 536–37.
90. See id. at 539.
91. See id.
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articulable reason why this group is being selected for differential
treatment, then the designation is arbitrary—the law creates a classification
for the sake of a classification—and this supports an inference that the law
is actually based on animus rather than a permissible governmental purpose.
The Court’s structural analysis (i.e., its analysis of the means-ends
connection) in Moreno is doctrinally significant. The Court had already
noted the direct evidence of legislative ill will toward hippies. The Court’s
concern in analyzing the antifraud justification was different. The Court
was concerned with the law’s reliance on “unsubstantiated assumptions”
about groups of persons based on their status (lack of family relationship)
rather than their conduct (actually committing fraud or fraud-related acts).92
Significantly, this latter analysis was not directly concerned with spite or
malice toward an unpopular group; it was a concern with a particular type
of imprecision in lawmaking: using a group’s status as a proxy for
anticipated conduct. This, in turn, points to more fundamental and
universal suspicion of all class-based legislation—not just that affecting
suspect or quasi-suspect classes.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, commenting that the majority was acting as
super-legislature in invalidating the amendment, rather than remaining in its
proper judicial role as defender of constitutional rights. Justice Rehnquist
offered that “[t]he Court’s opinion would make a very persuasive
congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the
limitation in question.”93 This critique is on-point. Rational basis review is
an easy standard for the government to meet precisely because it is meant to
force judicial deference to the legislative branch, even in cases of
questionable lawmaking.
And if the majority in Moreno had confined itself to concluding that the
law was poorly tailored, Justice Rehnquist’s critique would have thoroughly
undermined the basis of the opinion. If animus is nothing more than a lack
of fit between means and ends, then it becomes a doctrinal vehicle for
second-guessing the legislature.
But the majority in Moreno was saying something more. It was not
saying that it disagreed with the substantive policy goal of excluding
hippies from food stamp assistance. Indeed, the majority did not engage the
merits of this policy at all. Rather, the majority pointed to the unintended
and unfair consequences of using a status-based classification to punish
disfavored groups.94 In this case, reliance on the classification had the
effect of punishing many people who were not the target of Congress’s anti92. Id. at 535.
93. Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 538 (majority opinion) (“Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment
excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are likely to
abuse the program, but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that
they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”
(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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hippie policy, as the choice of plaintiffs demonstrated. In addition, rather
than questioning the anti-hippie policy or second guessing the legislative
tailoring, the majority in Moreno emphasized that the Equal Protection
Clause abhors classifications undertaken for their own sake (i.e.,
classifications undertaken for the sake of excluding some from benefits but
not others without some affirmative justification for doing so).95
Justice Rehnquist correctly insisted that the fact that a law has
unfortunate consequence—in Moreno, denying benefits to individuals who
were genuinely in need—is not a basis for invalidating a law. Such
decisions are within the legislature’s purview. But while the plaintiffs’
dilemma served as the sympathetic hook for the majority decision, it was
not, in fact, the reason the law was held invalid. The law was properly
invalidated because it represented arbitrary, class-based legislation of the
type that is offensive to equal protection principles. The effect on the
sympathetic plaintiffs was simply evidence of the negative, unintended
consequences of punitive, class-based legislation.
2. Animus as Private Bias: Palmore v. Sidoti
The Court’s next animus case, Palmore, departs somewhat from the
model established in the Court’s other animus decisions. To begin with, it
is a case involving race discrimination, so strict scrutiny was available. But
Palmore is nonetheless one of the recognized progenitors of the animus
doctrine relied on in subsequent animus decisions like Cleburne and Romer.
Further, it adds an important aspect to our understanding of unconstitutional
animus. Specifically, while the private bias in the Moreno case was
expressed by state actors, Palmore was concerned with bias originating in
private actors.
The form of state action at issue in Palmore was a family court order
taking custody of a child away from the mother and granting it instead to
the father.96 The basis for the family court’s decision was the mother’s
marriage to a man of a different race.97 The family court’s concern was that
the mother’s marriage choice would subject the child to stigmatization.98
Thus, the court’s order relied on a racial classification because “the
outcome [of the matter] would have been different had petitioner married a
Caucasian male of similar respectability.”99 In other words, race served to
determine the allocation of legal rights.
95. See id. at 534 (noting that “to be sustained, the challenged classification must
rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other than those specifically stated
in the congressional declaration of policy”—i.e., to prevent so-called “hippies” and “hippie
communes” from participating in the food stamp program (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
96. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1984).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 431.
99. Id. at 432.
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Because the family court order relied on a race classification, the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny review in assessing the
constitutionality of the family court’s ruling.100 The Court assessed the
state interests at stake, and had little difficulty concluding that the broader
goal of “granting custody based on the best interests of the child is
indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause.”101 Further, the Court acknowledged the reality of racial
and ethnic prejudices that would affect the experience of the child, and
likely in a negative way.102 And it is beyond dispute that if racial prejudice
is the problem, then reliance on a race classification is not only narrowly
tailored, but perfectly tailored, to address that problem. Hostility toward
mixed-race couples was pervasive, and it was only by keeping the child out
of such a relationship that the child could be shielded from those negative
social effects. In other words, the family court’s decision arguably satisfied
the strict scrutiny standard—the government had a compelling interest in
preserving the best interests of the child, and taking custody away from the
mother directly addressed that concern. But the superficial validity of the
family court’s order was poisoned by its capitulation to private bias.
On this point the Court famously stated, “Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”103 Note that the Court did not question whether the underlying bias
against mixed-race couples was fair or unfair (in Justice Scalia’s vernacular,
whether bias against mixed-race couples was just a form of legitimate
“Kulturkampf”104 for the time), but instead focused exclusively on the fact
that the family court’s order served to give effect to that bias.105 This focus
underscores that the problem with laws based on animus is that they
function to express and enforce private bias against a particular social
group, regardless of whether that bias itself is widely held or based in moral
or religious considerations. In short, the criticism lodged by Palmore does
not necessitate an inquiry into the nature or validity of the underlying bias
itself. Rather, Palmore focuses us on the fact that (1) as a general
proposition, the public laws are not to express and enforce private bias, and
(2) when they do, this invalidates the law, regardless of whether there is a
100. Id. at 432–33. The Court in Palmore articulated the strict scrutiny standard as
requiring that the classification “be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must
be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate purpose.” Id.
101. Id. at 433.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 433.
104. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court
has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”).
105. Similarly, as discussed above, the Court in Moreno conducted no inquiry into
whether bias against “hippies”—a classification that, unlike race, did not enjoy any form of
protected status—was justified. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. The doctrine
of unconstitutional animus does not distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate”
biases; it prohibits legislation that functions to enforce any type of social-group bias. In this
sense, the doctrine is formal, ahistorical, and universal.
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plausible government interest being served (for example, protecting the
bests interests of the child).
3. Animus As Stereotype and Fear: City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center
The Court’s next animus decision also addressed a situation where state
actors were deferring to the biases of private actors. In Cleburne, the Court
reviewed two distinct but related forms of state action. The first form of
state action was enactment of a city zoning regulation that required a special
use permit for the operation of certain types of group homes, including
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.”106 The plaintiff, Cleburne
Living Center (CLC), had proposed to build a group home for persons with
cognitive disabilities.107 CLC was required to obtain a special use permit
under the zoning regulation, as the home was considered analogous to a
hospital for the “feeble-minded.” The second form of state action was the
City Council’s decision under the ordinance to deny the special use permit
following a hearing on the request.108 Accordingly, CLC challenged the
zoning ordinance as facially invalid, and also challenged the regulation as
applied, based on the denial of the request submitted pursuant to the
regulation.109 The Court took up the latter challenge.
In its initial analysis determining what level of scrutiny to apply to the
equal protection claim, the Court rejected the argument that persons with
cognitive disabilities should be deemed a quasi-suspect class.110 The Court
examined all of the suspect classification criteria, including immutability
and political powerlessness, but focused on the fact that members of this
group were, in fact, generally compromised in their ability to function in
society, such that it would often be valid for legislative bodies to rely on a
related classification.111
Although the Court determined that the CLC’s claims did not merit
heightened scrutiny,112 the Court emphasized that this did not leave
plaintiffs without judicial protection. Specifically, citing Moreno, the Court
reiterated that even under deferential rational basis review, governments
may not rely on classifications that are “arbitrary” or “irrational,” nor may
laws be based on “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular

106. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 436 (1985) (alteration in
original) (quoting CLEBURNE, TEX., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE, § 8 (1965)).
107. See id. at 435–36.
108. See id. at 437.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 442.
111. See id. at 442–44. Even though the Court determined that the trait of developmental
disability was generally relevant to valid legislative purposes, the Court ultimately circled
back around to ask whether the trait was relevant to the specific legislative interest behind
the law in question—and concluded that it was not. See id. at 447–50.
112. See id. at 442–43.
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group.”113 And, indeed, the Court concluded that it was precisely these
impermissible purposes that were in play in the City Council’s decision.
In support of this conclusion, the Court cited direct evidence of ill will on
the part of community members as recorded in the legislative history.
Specifically, in debating whether to grant the special use permit,
community members came forward to express negative attitudes toward and
fears of persons with cognitive disabilities.114 They also expressed concern
that students from a nearby school might harass the CLC residents.115
Thus, the animus at issue was not “a bare . . . desire to harm” on the part of
the City Council, but was rather the City Council’s response to community
members’ fears and stereotypes. The Court rejected these views as a valid
basis for legislative decision making, citing Palmore for the proposition that
the law cannot give effect to private biases.116 Even under deferential
rational basis review, this was not a legitimate state interest.
As in Moreno, the Court in Cleburne went on to examine the other
purported goals of the City Council’s decision. The Court considered the
structure of the challenged state action as evidence supporting an inference
of animus.117 Specifically, the Court examined the connection between the
trait defining the group (cognitive disability) and the goals purportedly
served by the City Council’s decision.118 Ultimately, the Court declined to
apply heightened scrutiny because it concluded that persons with cognitive
disabilities were, in fact, different from others in ways that were
presumptively relevant to public legislation.119
But “this difference”—cognitive disability—was “largely irrelevant” to
the particular interests advanced by the city.120 Those interests included
avoiding excessive density, crowding, fire and flood safety, and traffic
congestion.121 As the Court reasoned, “The question is whether it is
rational to treat the mentally retarded differently. It is true that they suffer
disability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants a density
regulation that others need not observe is not at all apparent.”122 The Court
emphasized that these concerns would be present with any request for group
housing, including apartment buildings and fraternities and sororities—
types of multiple dwellings not addressed by the zoning regulation.123
Because “[t]he City never justifie[d] its apparent view that other people can
live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally retarded persons
113. Id. at 446–47 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
114. See id. at 448.
115. See id. at 449.
116. Id. at 448 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
117. See id. at 448–50.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 442–46.
120. Id. at 448.
121. See id. at 450.
122. Id. at 449–50.
123. See id.
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cannot,”124 the Court inferred that “requiring the permit in this case appears
to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”125
Again, the classification at issue here was arguably rationally related to
the governmental interest on a superficial level. Indeed, almost any form of
group housing could pose concerns in terms of density, crowding, fire and
flood safety, etc. But what the Court concerned itself with was the fact that
people with developmental disabilities had been arbitrarily targeted for
regulation whereas other groups had not. The targeting was arbitrary
because the trait that characterized this group had no special relevance to
the government’s purported interests as compared to other, objectively
similar groups that were not regulated. This objective, structural feature of
the state action at issue supported an inference of animus. Thus, while
underinclusiveness generally would not be fatal under traditional rational
basis review, when that underinclusiveness approaches arbitrariness, this
suggests that the law “rest[s] on an irrational prejudice” against the
classified group.126 Direct evidence indicating that the purpose of the law
was to discriminate against a particular social group discredited the other
purposes offered by the government and required a credible explanation of
how the trait at issue related to the object of the regulation.
4. Animus and Sexual Orientation: Romer v. Evans
The concept of unconstitutional animus reappeared in dramatic fashion
over a decade later in Romer. The law at issue in Romer was an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution that had been enacted by popular
referendum.127 The purpose and function of Amendment 2 was to eliminate
and prevent future adoption of any antidiscrimination protections based on
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual status.128
The Court declined to address whether sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, or whether Amendment 2 infringed on a fundamental right,
such that some form of heightened scrutiny would be required. Instead, the
Court proceeded directly to rational basis review, appearing to acknowledge
its deferential nature: “a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a
legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to
the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous.”129
As discussed above, the Court had previously identified animus on two
bases: (1) direct evidence that the law was based on private bias toward a
124. Id. at 450 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). The amendment was referred to as
“Amendment 2.” Id. at 623.
128. See id. at 624.
129. Id. at 632.

2012]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS

911

particular social group (on the part of either state or private actors) and
(2) an inference of animus based on a law’s structure—specifically, the lack
of an affirmative connection between the trait defining a group and the
purported goal of the law or other state action.130 Although there was a vast
record of antigay sentiments (i.e., direct evidence of private bias) giving
birth to the referendum that enacted Amendment 2,131 the Romer Court did
not rely on or even discuss such evidence in finding that the law was based
on animus. Rather, the Court focused exclusively on the law’s structure.
Why would the Court ignore such strong direct evidence of
impermissible animus? This omission is probably best explained by the
fact that the Romer decision was handed down in the awkward interstitial
period between the Court’s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick132 and
Lawrence v. Texas. Bowers permitted states to criminalize homosexual
sodomy, in essence making it legitimate to disfavor homosexual and
bisexual orientation, as homosexual conduct closely correlates to
homosexual status.133 Lawrence later overturned Bowers, declaring that
states could not criminalize private, consensual sexual conduct between
adults based on bare moral disapproval of that conduct.134 However,
Romer, which involved a law disfavoring homosexual and bisexual
orientation in a different context, was decided prior to Lawrence. With
Bowers still on the books, the Romer Court could hardly deem homosexuals
and bisexuals to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class, or question the general
validity of antigay legislation.
So although the Romer Court could have easily relied on direct evidence
of animus, it ignored this evidence and instead performed a novel structural
analysis.
Specifically, the Romer Court relied on two different
characteristics of Amendment 2 to infer the presence of unconstitutional
animus. The first related to what can be characterized as a radical lack of fit
between the law’s means and ends. Again, under traditional rational basis
review, even a radical lack of fit may be acceptable. And under the
traditional standard, the law likely would have been upheld—the Court
would simply require that there be some possible connection between the
classification relied upon by the challenged law (here, sexual orientation)
and the state interests served by the law (conserving antidiscrimination
enforcement resources and protecting citizens’ freedom of association).
And such a connection was clearly present in Romer. Sexual orientation
was previously a basis for antidiscrimination protection, and so sexual
130. For (1), see supra Part II.A.1–2. For (2), see supra Part II.A.3.
131. See Cara DeGette, Inside the Belly of the Beast, in RESISTING THE RAINBOW: RIGHTWING RESPONSES TO LGBT GAINS, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 29 (2012),
http://www.publiceye.org/Reports/CO%20Case%20Study.pdf.
132. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
133. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581–82 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is
conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.”).
134. See id. at 578.
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orientation was self-evidently relevant to reconfiguring the priorities of
antidiscrimination law. Similarly, if a state seeks to protect citizens’ right
not to associate with homosexuals or bisexuals, sexual orientation is
precisely the relevant classification to protect that right.
The Court avoided this difficulty by changing the terms of the means and
ends analysis. The Court focused not on the precise mechanism
Amendment 2 employed (i.e., the classification of sexual orientation), but
on Amendment 2’s impact, which it characterized as vast.135 Indeed, the
Court devoted an entire separate section of its opinion to describing the
law’s impact, explaining that rather than placing homosexuals and bisexuals
on a level playing field with everyone else, the law actively stripped
homosexuals of rights, first by repealing local antidiscrimination
ordinances.136 In addition, Amendment 2 prevented municipalities from
enacting any new protective legislation in the future without first amending
the state constitution to repeal Amendment 2.137 Thus, homosexuals were
left open to discrimination in the public and private spheres without any
recourse. Rather than merely taking away “special rights,” Amendment 2
“impose[d] a special disability upon those persons [homosexuals and
bisexuals] alone.”138
Having described the vast impact of the law, the Court then asked
whether that impact was justified by the State’s purported interests in the
law and concluded that it was not. Amendment 2 inflicted on homosexuals
“immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for [the law].”139 With respect
to both of the State’s purported interests, the Court determined that “[t]he
breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”140 Because the
law’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it . . .
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything other than animus toward
the class it affects.”141 Note that rational basis review typically examines
the relationship between the classification employed and the law’s
purpose—examining whether the law’s purpose justifies its impact is a
fundamentally different inquiry and one that involves a largely unfettered
assessment of fairness.
In so holding, the Court characterized the first purported state interest—
“conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups”142—as
relatively trivial. And the Court reached the same conclusion, without
extensive analysis, with respect to the second purported state interest:
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632– 34.
See id. at 627, 629–31.
Id. at 627 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 635.
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protecting citizens’ freedom of association.143 This seems patently
incorrect. It may be true that the law would not actually succeed in
protecting anyone’s freedom of association, or that by “freedom of
association” the State actually meant “right to unfairly discriminate against
homosexuals and bisexuals.” But the Court did not critique this purported
governmental interest on this level (i.e., it did not focus on whether the
classification actually served to advance the State’s purported goals or was
valid in and of itself). Rather, the Court treated Coloradans’ freedom of
association as a relatively trivial interest on par with conserving
antidiscrimination enforcement resources.
In this way the Court glossed over the real—and most controversial—
issue in the case: whether it was legitimate for a state to protect citizens’
freedom not to associate with members of unpopular groups, and to use the
law to enforce that right. As a general matter, after Moreno, Palmore and
Cleburne, the answer was clearly “no.” But the Court was hamstrung in
reaching this conclusion because Bowers was still good law at the time
Romer was decided. And Bowers clearly supported the proposition that it
was permissible to disapprove of homosexual conduct and orientation (as
Justice Scalia emphasized in his dissent in Romer). Accordingly, the Romer
majority performed a sleight of hand. It could not directly attack the
validity of antigay bias, so it transformed its analysis into a structural
critique.
The second basis on which the Court inferred animus also looked to the
structure of the law, but from a slightly different angle. Specifically, the
Court stated that the discrimination worked by Amendment 2 was “of an
unusual character,”144 which in and of itself prompted “careful
consideration”145 of the law’s validity. Specifically, the law had “the
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a
single named group,”146 “identif[ying] persons by a single trait and then
den[ying] them protection across the board.”147 Further, the law singled out
this group—which could fairly be described as “politically unpopular”—for
a significant rights deprivation.148 The Court focused on the objective
function of the law, which was to create distinctions between classes of
persons where none had previously existed. Prior to Amendment 2,
homosexuals and bisexuals in Colorado had equal access to
antidiscrimination measures enacted by local governments. The objective
function of Amendment 2 was to differentiate homosexuals and bisexuals
with respect to these rights.
143. See id. at 635.
144. Id. at 633 (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37–38
(1928)).
145. Id. (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)).
146. Id. at 632.
147. Id. at 633.
148. Id. at 634 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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The Court identified “this sort” of law as incompatible with our
constitutional tradition149:
[L]aws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or
general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense.150

In other words, a law may not draw classifications of persons “for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”151 The Court
alluded to the manner in which this principle enforces the core values of the
Equal Protection Clause: “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”152
The rule the Court endorsed in Romer is murky. The Court suggested
that laws suffering from a radical lack of fit would be presumed to be based
in animus, but it is unclear how this relates to the existing tailoring
requirements of rational basis review. The Court also indicated that animus
may be inferred where a law is “of an unusual character,” but it is not clear
exactly what laws would fall into this category.153
In his dissent, Justice Scalia directly engaged the issue that the majority
avoided: whether it was permissible for the law to protect citizens’ rights
not to associate with those they prefer not to associate.154 As Justice Scalia
phrased it, the issue was whether Coloradans may seek “to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.”155 In support of
this proposition, Justice Scalia reasonably cited to the Court’s own decision
in Bowers, which had been conspicuously ignored by the majority.156
Justice Scalia interpreted Bowers as standing for the proposition that it was
permissible for governments to single out homosexuality for unfavorable
treatment—in essence, that it was permissible to disfavor homosexual status
because it was permissible under Bowers to disfavor homosexual
conduct.157
Even accepting that Justice Scalia may have been right to rely on the
connection between homosexual conduct and homosexual status at the time
that Romer was decided, he lost that ground when the Court decided
Lawrence, which reversed the Bowers decision. After Lawrence, even if
one could equate homosexual conduct with homosexual status, homosexual
conduct could no longer be criminalized and the related justification for
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
Id. at 633.
See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 636, 640 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
Id. at 642.
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disfavoring homosexual status collapsed. After Lawrence, classifications
based on homosexual status must be treated the same as all other
classifications based on status—with presumptive disfavor and an eye
toward the presence of animus.
B. Additional Cases Related to Animus
The four cases discussed above represent the official canon of cases
decided on the basis of unconstitutional animus. But there are additional
cases in which we can identify a similar theme: the law at issue was found
unconstitutional because its primary function was to express and enforce
distinctions between social classes.
1. Animus and Race Segregation: Brown v. Board of Education and
Loving v. Virginia
The first of these cases is Brown. Brown is both seminal and enigmatic:
it is seminal in that it is hailed as visionary and just, and enigmatic in that it
is difficult to pin down exactly what Brown stands for doctrinally. As is
well-known, the Court in Brown held that state-sponsored racial segregation
in public education violated the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of
whether the segregated schools were purportedly “equal” in terms of
tangible resources (e.g., physical plant, books, teachers).158 In a succinct
opinion, the Court advanced two interrelated bases in support of this result.
First, the Court (in)famously referred to the negative psychological effects
of segregation on black children.159 The reasoning—which is suspect on
many levels160—was that segregation deprived black school children of
equal educational opportunities because it created feelings of inferiority in
them. These feelings of inferiority then interfered with their ability to learn
and to reap the myriad social, economic, and civic benefits of public
Under this reasoning, segregation is not necessarily
education.161
inherently problematic, but only because of its negative effects on the
targeted group.
158. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
159. See id. at 494 (“To separate [black children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”).
160. Suspect was (1) the Court’s confidence in contemporary “psychological knowledge”
and (2) its conclusion that segregation was damaging to black children alone, and not their
white counterparts. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the
Dual Harm of Segregation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82 (2004) (“This rationale, that
segregation was unconstitutional solely because of the harm it inflicted in AfricanAmericans, created the impression that as a remedy for segregation, desegregation amounted
to a social welfare program where whites were compelled to donate in-kind contributions to
blacks in the form of interracial contact. In other words, if the harm occasioned by
segregation was one-sided and fell only on blacks, as Brown indicated, integration conferred
benefits only on blacks, which necessarily were paid for by whites.”).
161. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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The second rationale focused more squarely on the morality of
segregation itself, regardless of documented psychological effects. The
Court suggested, albeit sotto voce, that segregation of social groups was
unconstitutional because it was not a proper function of the public laws.
Specifically, the Court quoted the Kansas district court opinion to the effect
that “[t]he impact [of racial segregation] is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”162
Thus, the second rationale for striking the separate-but-equal doctrine
focused on the expressive function of state action—in Brown, this function
was to denote the inferiority of one social group to another by requiring
their separation. Stated this way, the harm of state-sponsored segregation
was not that it created “feelings of inferiority,”163 but that it stood as the
government expressing a judgment that one social group is inferior to
another—in this case, expressing an ideology of white supremacy. Whether
the laws can eliminate privately held ideologies of this nature is one matter,
but it is clear that the public laws cannot express and enforce such
ideologies164—even where the goal of doing so is “promotion of [the
people’s] comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good
order.”165 Explicit segregation of social groups with respect to important
public institutions is a prime example of discrimination for the sake of
discrimination. It is sufficient evidence of unconstitutional animus, because
such laws do not purport to serve independent purposes.
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court determined that the challenged
law impermissibly expressed an ideology of white supremacy through
legally enforced separation of the races.166 Like the school segregation at
issue in Brown, the antimiscegenation statute at issue in Loving can be
characterized as a form of separate-but-equal discrimination. Indeed, in
defense of the law, Virginia argued that antimiscegenation laws of this type
were not of concern to the Equal Protection Clause because they were
applied to blacks and whites equally: members of neither group were
permitted to marry members of the other, and the legal penalties for doing
so were the same for both.167
The Court rejected this contention, noting that, as a historical matter,
reliance on racial classifications was always of concern to the Equal
Protection Clause.168 Further, like the Brown Court, the Loving Court
focused on the expressive function of the challenged law and found it
162. Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
163. Id.
164. This is precisely the point the Court made later in Palmore v. Sidoti. See 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”).
165. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), abrogated by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
166. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
167. See id. at 7.
168. See id. at 8.
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substantively impermissible.169 The Court discerned the content of this
expression in a number of ways. First, the Court quoted the trial court’s
opinion sentencing the Lovings to exile from the state. In that opinion, the
trial court proclaimed an explicitly racist, quasi-religious, and nominally
geographical justification for the laws:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix.170

Second, in addition to the justification provided by the trial court, the
Court noted the historical context of the adoption of antimiscegenation
laws, emphasizing their origin in the institution of slavery and in notions of
racial integrity and nativism.171 Third, the Court rejected precedent
validating the state purpose of “preserv[ing] the racial integrity of its
citizens,” as an “obvious[] endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy.”172 Finally, the Court looked closely at the structure and
function of the statute, and noted that it was only white persons who were
not permitted to intermarry with other races; non-whites of different races
could inter-marry.173 This revealed that the law served no “overriding
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” and was “designed
to maintain White Supremacy.”174
Thus, one may read Loving as standing for the proposition that it is
impermissible for laws to exist solely for the purpose of enforcing
distinctions between social groups, thereby expressing the view that certain
social groups are superior to others. Surely the fact that the segregation at
issue in Brown and Loving was based on race created particularly weighty
concerns for the Court. But the analysis in these cases only works because
the Court attributed inherent meaning to the act of segregation: to segregate
groups that are similarly situated with respect to the right at stake is to
express an ideology that one social group is inherently inferior to another.
This the law may not do. In such cases, the structure and function of the
law—segregation of social groups—indicates the presence of impermissible
animus.
2. Animus and Class-Based Legislation: Plyler v. Doe and
Zobel v. Williams
The Court’s 1982 decision in Plyler is a case where the plaintiffs
prevailed under rational basis review, not because the law at issue expressed
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 11.
Id. at 3 (quoting the trial court).
See id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
See id. at 11–12.
Id. at 11.
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hostility or ill will per se, but because the law tended to create persistent
divisions between social classes.175 Plyler is significant for three reasons.
First, it presents a thorough exegesis on the Equal Protection Clause’s
concern with status-based classifications (i.e., laws that tend to produce or
reinforce a caste society).176 Second, like Cleburne, it reaffirms the
principle announced in Moreno that it is impermissible to exclude members
of a social group merely for the sake of excluding them.177 Rather, there
must be some affirmative reason why it is more effective to exclude this
group than another (i.e., the exclusion must not be arbitrary).178 Third,
Plyler emphasizes that laws may not be used to punish status through the
regulation of unrelated conduct.179
At issue in Plyler was a Texas law that sought to deny public education
to school-age children who did not have documentation of their citizenship
status.180 The specific mechanism the State used was withholding funds
from local school districts to the extent such funds would be used to educate
children not legally admitted to the United States.181
The Court began its analysis with the emphatic claim that “[t]he Equal
Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of
all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”182 The Court then
proceeded to determine the proper level of scrutiny to apply to the
challenged legislation, analyzing whether the targeted group—the children
of undocumented immigrants—should be considered a suspect class.183
The Court determined that they should not.184 This was because entry into
the class was “the product of voluntary action”—illegally entering into the
country.185 Further, it could not be argued that the distinguishing trait of
the class was presumptively irrelevant to all conceivable legislative
purposes.186 Immigration status is patently relevant to legitimate goals in
immigration law and policy.
But the Court nonetheless expressed an overriding concern with laws that
punished individuals for circumstances beyond their control187—a core
principle of equal protection jurisprudence. It expressed particular concern
over the fact that undocumented children had little or no control over their
175. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982).
176. See id. at 210–16.
177. See id. at 216–18.
178. See id. at 217–18.
179. See id. at 220 (“Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults
by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct
against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.”).
180. See id. at 205.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 213.
183. See id. at 216–20.
184. Id. at 219 n.19.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 220.
187. See id.
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undocumented status: “Legislation imposing special disabilities upon
groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests
the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to abolish.”188 Indeed, the undocumented status of these children
was determined by a combination of the conduct of their parents and the
poorly implemented immigration policies of the U.S. government.189
The Court focused on the role of government policies in creating an
underclass of undocumented immigrants, shifting some of the blame from
the immigrants themselves, and thus further shifting any conceivable blame
away from their children. Indeed, the innocence of the immigrant children
was a key theme in the Court’s analysis:
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is
the product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply
with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor
children of such illegal entrants . . . . [T]he children who are plaintiffs in
these cases “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own
status.” . . . “[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”190

This language touches on the core values originally animating the
Supreme Court’s suspect classification analysis, which can be framed as a
status/conduct distinction: in our democracy, the law may only penalize
conduct that is under the individual’s control, not a status or identity that is
beyond the individual’s control.191
The Court also expressed the related principle that laws cannot
differentially distribute legal benefits based on a trait (undocumented status)
unrelated to the benefit at issue (primary education).192 In asserting that the
law met the first prong of rational basis review—serving a legitimate
governmental interest—the State offered the goal of supporting federal
immigration policy, which disapproved of the presence of undocumented
immigrants in the country.193 In assessing this interest, the Court noted that
it is unquestionably legitimate and within the State’s prerogative to decide
188. Id. at 216 n.14.
189. In discussing the status of undocumented aliens, the Court noted that ineffective
enforcement of immigration laws had created “a substantial ‘shadow population’” in the
United States, raising “the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens.” Id.
at 218–19. “The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.” Id. at 219.
190. Id. at 219–220 (fifth alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977), Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
191. “[D]enial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of
the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.” Id. at 221–22.
192. See id. at 224–26.
193. See id.
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how to distribute educational resources and to prefer residents over
undocumented immigrants.194 But the Court insisted that this was not a
blanket authorization to impose disabilities on the group—in particular
because federal immigration policy was not concerned with educational
opportunities for children.195 Denying educational opportunities to these
children was “not a rational response” to federal policy disapproving of the
presence of these children in the country.196 Imposing immigration
consequences would address the problematic conduct, but imposing
unrelated educational consequences was effectively punishing status.197
The State further argued that the law served the interest of “‘preserv[ing]
the state’s limited resources for the education of its lawful residents.’”198
The Court responded, “The State must do more than justify its classification
with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.”199 Further, there
was no demonstrated connection between denying education to children and
the State’s purported interest in “protect[ing] itself from an influx of illegal
immigrants.”200
While acknowledging that it was not permitted to “reduce expenditures
for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its
schools,” the State nonetheless contended that excluding undocumented
children was not “arbitrary.”201 In particular, the State argued that
educating undocumented children interfered with the goal of “provid[ing]
high-quality public education.”202 But in examining the record, the Court
found no evidence of a connection between excluding undocumented
children and educational quality.203 Rather, the Court concluded that
undocumented children were “indistinguishable” from other children in
terms of the costs of educating them.204 Thus, it would be arbitrary to
single them out for rights deprivation.
Under Plyler, impermissible animus includes a bare desire to exclude a
particular social group, and the presence of animus can be proven by the
lack of an affirmative relationship between the trait defining the
classification (immigration status) and the interests being regulated (public
education).
This concern with laws that enforce class distinction was also at the core
of the Court’s decision in Zobel. The law at issue was an Alaska statute
194. See id. at 224.
195. Id. at 226.
196. Id. at 224 n.21.
197. See id. at 226.
198. Id. at 227 (quoting Brief for the Appellants at 26, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(No. 80-1538), 1981 WL 389967, at *26).
199. Id. (citing Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976)).
200. Id. at 228.
201. Id. at 229.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
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that created a fund based on the State’s oil revenue and distributed money
from that fund differentially to residents based on years of residency.205 In
a move repeated years later in Romer, the Court declined to consider
whether heightened scrutiny was required for the law, instead proceeding
directly to rational basis review.206
The Court first noted that the State’s goal—“creating a financial
incentive for individuals to establish and maintain Alaska residence”—was
not rationally related to the mechanism of financially disfavoring new
residents.207 Further, the Court expressed concern that “Alaska’s reasoning
could open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and
services according to length of residency.”208 This, in turn, “would permit
the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent
classes”209—a result that, according to the Court, “would be clearly
impermissible.”210 The law failed, in part, because of its tendency to create
permanent social classes—in essence, a caste society.
3. Animus and Moral Disapproval: Lawrence v. Texas
Finally, we come to Lawrence—the case that righted the wrongs of
Bowers a mere seventeen years after Bowers was decided. While nominally
a due process case, the real focus of Lawrence was to reject differential
treatment based on sexual orientation.211 Lawrence addressed whether a
state could criminalize homosexual sodomy that took place in private
between consenting adults.212 There was no question that the animating
spirit of the law was bare moral disapproval of homosexual conduct and
identity.213 The question was whether such disapproval was a permissible
basis for legislation.214 The Court held that it was not.215
In 1986, the majority in Bowers had framed the relevant question as
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”216 Starting from this premise, the
Bowers Court easily concluded that the Constitution conferred no such right

205. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56 (1982).
206. See id. at 60–61; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996).
207. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61–62.
208. Id. at 64.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding that “[p]ersons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do,” because sexual relationships are “‘matters[] involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
212. See id. at 563.
213. See id. at 568–69.
214. See id. at 578–79.
215. See id.
216. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
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and, therefore, state laws could permissibly reflect traditional and deepseated moral disapproval of sodomy, homosexuality, and homosexuals.217
The majority in Lawrence signaled its intent to depart from Bowers’
approach with the first words of its decision: “Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places.”218 Thus, the Lawrence Court focused on universal rights—
specifically, liberty—and examined the extent to which the government
could permissibly intrude on individual liberty, rather than searching the
text of the Constitution for permission to engage in a particular sex act.219
Thus, the first step in reversing the Bowers decision was to frame the issue
in terms of broad and common interests in liberty, autonomy, and
privacy.220 The Lawrence majority then tied these broad concepts to the
conduct at issue by analogizing to the themes of bodily, reproductive, and
sexual autonomy present in Eisenstadt v. Baird,221 Griswold v.
Connecticut,222 and Carey v. Population Services International.223
And here the submerged equal protection analysis of the Lawrence
majority began to emerge. Everyone enjoys rights to bodily autonomy and
privacy in intimate relations. Denying these rights to some but not others
based on sexual orientation was class-based treatment justified by nothing
more than private moral preferences. Indeed, despite disavowing an equal
protection framework, the Court nonetheless asserted that “[p]ersons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes [making
choices about one’s intimate and personal life], just as heterosexual persons
do.”224
Laws criminalizing sodomy—whether all acts of sodomy or only
homosexual sodomy—can be seen as laws that give effect to purely private
moral preferences, which are not properly the subject of public legislation.
In this way, Bowers and Lawrence dovetail with the Court’s animus cases
in reaffirming the proper and improper objective function of the laws.
Indeed, the Lawrence Court recognized that beliefs about the immorality of
homosexuality were deeply and sincerely held:
The condemnation [of homosexual conduct] has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.225

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 190–96.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 564.
Id.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
Id. at 571.
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Still, the fervor and consensus surrounding these beliefs did not make
them a fit subject for public legislation: “These considerations do not
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the state to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law.”226 That is, the reasonableness or
correctness of the bias does not matter. “‘[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation
from constitutional attack.’”227 It is of course permissible for private actors
to have such morally and religiously based beliefs, and to fight for their
beliefs in the realm of culture, but not to use the public laws to enforce and
reify those beliefs.
Thus, Lawrence provides contemporary confirmation of truths
established in earlier cases: that the law cannot be used to enforce private
biases, and that the fact that such biases are widely, dearly, and sincerely
held is irrelevant to the analysis.
In her concurrence to Lawrence, Justice O’Connor explicitly articulated
what the majority indicated only implicitly. The real problem with the antisodomy law was that it targeted homosexuals alone for conduct in which
heterosexuals were permitted to engage:
The statute at issue here makes sodomy a crime only if a person “engages
in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”
Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas.
That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the
participants.228

The law was invalid because it “ma[de] homosexuals unequal in the eyes
of the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—subject to
criminal sanction.”229 In other words, the objective of the law was “‘a bare
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’”230—an example of
unconstitutional animus.
In response to the State’s argument that it had a legitimate interest in
promoting morality, Justice O’Connor contended (somewhat improbably),
226. Id.
227. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
228. Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)
(West 2003)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 580 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
According to Justice O’Connor, the effect of a finding of animus was to trigger “a more
searching form of rational basis review.” Id. She further noted that, while the vast majority
of laws generally survived rational basis review, the Court was most likely to strike a law
under this deferential standard where the law served to “inhibit[] personal relationships.” Id.
In support of this contention, she pointed to Moreno and Cleburne, both of which analyzed
laws dealing with the freedom to enter into certain living arrangements, as well as
Eisenstadt, in which the law at issue dealt with access to contraception. See id.
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that “Bowers did not hold that moral disapproval of a group is a rational
basis under the Equal Protection Clause.”231 Indeed, Justice O’Connor
asserted, moral disapproval of a group, “like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause.”232 Justice O’Connor thereby properly placed
the emphasis back on the status-conduct distinction that is necessarily
implicated by the Equal Protection Clause’s overarching principles. Along
these lines, she rejected that State’s contention that the law targeted conduct
rather than status, observing that homosexual conduct “is closely correlated
with being homosexual.”233 Thus, one could not escape the fact that the
law was “directed toward gay persons as a class.”234
Both the majority opinion (implicitly) and the concurrence (explicitly) in
Lawrence recognized the principle that laws criminalizing homosexual
conduct in fact criminalized homosexual identity, and that bare moral
disapproval of a social group based upon identity was an impermissible
purpose for legislation. This conclusion did not rest on a determination of
whether the underlying bias was justified, widely held, or based in sincere
religious or moral beliefs. Rather, it rested on the premise that the laws do
not exist to enforce and solidify such biases.
III. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF ANIMUS
There are three open questions at this point in the Supreme Court’s
animus jurisprudence: (1) How does the Court define unconstitutional
animus? (2) What does the Court accept as evidence of animus? (3) What
doctrinal significance does the Court attach to a finding of animus? To
advance the strongest theory of animus, we must answer these questions
with an eye toward accounting for all of the Supreme Court’s animus cases
and reflecting the core principles of the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Defining Animus
Definitions of unconstitutional animus can be placed on a spectrum from
understanding animus as a form of impermissible subjective intent, to
understanding animus as a form of impermissible objective function. On
one end of the spectrum is the understanding of animus that Justice Scalia
articulated in his dissent to Romer and which the First Circuit recently
reiterated in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and
Human Services235: that animus is “a fit of spite.”236 While this narrow

231. Id. at 582.
232. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996), U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
233. Id. at 583.
234. Id.
235. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ), aff’g Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374
(D. Mass. 2010), and Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp.

2012]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS

925

understanding accounts for some of the Court’s animus cases, it is refuted
by the majority of them.237 For example, the record in Cleburne did not
suggest that the community was expressing “spite” toward those with
cognitive disabilities. Rather, the discrimination in that case was based on
stereotypes and unfounded fears.238 Similarly, in Palmore, the animus at
issue was not “spite” toward interracial couples per se, but very real and
very pervasive private bias.239 In the segregation cases—Brown and
Loving—one cannot directly identify “spite”; rather, there was simply the
bare purpose of separating groups of persons based on race.240 And finally,
Plyler and Zobel can be seen as instances where the government merely
sought to preserve resources for a favored social group, not harm the
excluded group.241 Thus, there are many forms of subjective intent other
than “spite” that fall into the category of unconstitutional animus.
A somewhat broader definition of animus still located in the subjective
intent camp understands animus as the desire to harm a politically
unpopular group. This understanding was first set forth in the Court’s
decision in Moreno and became the centerpiece of Romer. Again, however,
a showing of desire to harm is sufficient to prove animus, but is not
necessary. As discussed above, such intent was not explicitly present in
Palmore, Cleburne, Brown, Loving, Plyler, or Zobel.
In the wake of Romer, Akhil Amar advanced a theory of animus that
focused less on subjective intent and more on objective function,
understanding the animus doctrine as a variation of the prohibition against
bills of attainder.242 This is an understanding of animus that is very much
tied to Romer’s focus on the way in which Amendment 2 “singled out” gays
and lesbians for disfavored treatment—a theme the Ninth Circuit then
reiterated in Perry.243 But again, looking at other animus cases, it is
apparent that this is a part, but not the whole, of animus. For example, the
City Council in Cleburne did not “single out” those with cognitive
disabilities in the way that Amar describes. Rather, the council applied an
2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012), 12-15
(U.S. July 3, 2012), and 12-97 (U.S. July 20, 2012).
236. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Massachusetts,
682 F.3d at 15–16 (discussing moral disapproval of homosexuality as a justification for
DOMA).
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
239. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
240. Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954).
241. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207–08 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59
(1982).
242. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 203, 203–04 (1996).
243. See id. at 207–08; see also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012),
aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed,
No. 12-144 (U.S. July 30, 2012) (excluding same-sex couples from state-sponsored marriage
while allowing opposite-sex couples access to that “honored” status).
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existing discretionary framework with reference to private bias.244 The
process flaw there was not the process of singling-out, but the reliance on
private bias. While the “singling-out” dynamic was arguably present in
Moreno, Romer, Plyler, and Lawrence, it does not adequately explain what
was impermissible about the laws in Palmore, Cleburne, Brown, Loving,
and Zobel. Taking into account all of these cases—from those in which
state or private actors explicitly express hostility toward a particular group
to those where a law appears to simply cordon off scarce resources on
superficially reasonable grounds—what emerges is that animus is a type of
impermissible objective function. Specifically, animus is present where the
public laws are harnessed to create and enforce distinctions between social
groups—that is, groups of persons identified by status rather than conduct.
There are strong policy considerations behind this understanding of
animus. First, such laws run counter to the meritocratic principles
underlying the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution generally, and
American democracy as a whole.245 Second, per Brown and Loving, laws
that perform this function always express an ideology of social group
supremacy—something the Constitution does not permit.246 Third, the
effect (intended or not) of such laws is to create permanent classes, or
castes, which strikes at the heart of the fundamental and ambitious purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause: to eliminate all forms of class-based
legislation.247
B. Evidence of Animus
A related but distinct question is how, given the available precedent,
plaintiffs can prove that a challenged law is based in unconstitutional
animus. The cases instruct that there are essentially two methods: by
pointing to direct evidence of private bias in the legislative record, or by
supporting an inference of animus based on the structure of a law.248

244. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
245. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311,
369–83 (2012).
246. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that “[t]he fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy” and striking this purpose as invidious discrimination); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids laws that
“imply[] inferiority in civil society” (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879))).
247. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
248. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1091, 1117 (2006) (asserting that where a law is not facially discriminatory and there is
no indication of animus in its legislative history, the democratic process has not failed).
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The easy case is where the record presents direct evidence of private bias
as the impetus behind adopting a law.249 Such statements may be made by
legislators or private individuals and may express any number of sentiments
that shed light on the true function of the law: a mere recognition of the
existence of private bias;250 an expression of bare moral disapproval;251
and/or statements of stereotype or fear.252
In terms of inferring animus based on the structure of the law, Cleburne
provides the most compelling example. In essence, the Court in Cleburne
performed a sort of micro-suspect classification analysis to infer the
presence of animus. Traditional suspect classification analysis examines a
number of factors, including whether: (1) the group targeted by the
classification is politically powerless; (2) that group has suffered a history
of discrimination; (3) the characteristic defining the group is immutable;
and (4) the characteristic is ever a valid consideration in legislative
action.253 Based on a fact-intensive assessment of these various inherently
changeable and backward-looking factors, the Court imposes a prospective
presumption that laws relying on such classifications are suspect, and
expresses this suspicion by applying heightened scrutiny in such cases.
The analysis performed in Cleburne was a “micro” suspect classification
analysis in that it did not seek to declare the classification suspect for all
time (indeed, the Cleburne Court declined to designate persons with
cognitive disabilities as a suspect class, largely because the defining trait
would often be relevant to valid legislative goals),254 but instead looked at
the validity of the classification in light of the interests at stake in that
particular case. In Cleburne, there was no affirmative connection between
the trait of cognitive disability and either (1) the plaintiffs’ entitlement to
generally available group housing, or (2) the government’s interest in
regulating group housing. In the absence of this type of logical connection,
animus may be inferred. This kind of analysis—which focuses closely on
the nature of the trait being used—expresses a general skepticism of classbased legislation, without reifying fixed “categories of concern” (suspect
249. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
law challenged in Moreno); supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing the same
with respect to the law in Cleburne).
250. See supra notes 96–98, 103, 105 and accompanying text (describing the bias at issue
in Palmore and the Supreme Court’s reaction to it).
251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (discussing the role that moral
disapproval played in Bowers).
252. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[M]ere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”).
253. See Eskridge, supra note 247, at 10.
254. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (concluding that cognitive disability is not a suspect
classification because “it is undeniable, and it is not argued otherwise here, that those who
are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday
world”).
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classifications) and, by extension, categories of presumptive non-concern
(non-suspect classifications).
By contrast, the Court’s structural analysis of animus in Romer does not
really hold water. The Court in essence said that Amendment 2 must be
based in animus because there was a radical lack of fit between the law’s
means and ends—but this of course would mean that the law would fail
standard rational basis review, making the Court’s conclusion regarding
animus doctrinally gratuitous.
As discussed above, the real story with Romer was that there was ample
direct evidence of animus, but the Court could not invoke this evidence
because Bowers was still good law when Romer was decided—and Bowers
could certainly be read to authorize legislative disfavoring of sexual
minorities. Thus, the Romer Court instead characterized Amendment 2 as
an impermissible “sort” of law invalidated by its structure, not by virtue of
the fact that it expressed disapproval of sexual minorities.255
Rather than provoking the Court to apply a form of heightened scrutiny,
we can read the cases as providing plaintiffs with an opportunity to
challenge rational basis review with affirmative evidence. Specifically, the
Court allows plaintiffs to affirmatively prove the presence of
unconstitutional animus through close examination of the connection
between the identifying trait and the interests—both individual and
governmental—implicated by the law.
This understanding of
unconstitutional animus and what it takes to prove its existence has several
advantages from a doctrinal perspective. First, it does not require proof of
subjective intent along the lines of the discriminatory intent doctrine
deployed in cases of nonfacial discrimination. This is appropriate because
the Equal Protection Clause demands heightened skepticism of laws
containing facial classifications of persons; there is no reason to require that
such classifications be invoked maliciously. Second, it does not require
judges to engage in the dangerous business of making broad assessments
about the relative political power of particular groups, the degree of
discrimination they have suffered, etc. (i.e., the factors of suspect
classification analysis). Such assessments are best avoided because they
rest in the shifting sands of political and social reality and should not be
cemented in precedent. They also suggest that discrimination against some
(non-suspect or quasi-suspect) social groups is permissible. Further, there
are serious questions about the extent to which courts are qualified to assess
social reality in this fashion. Finally, this understanding of unconstitutional
animus gives life to the essential anti-caste mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause, but in a way that is at once more concrete—because it is grounded
in limited factual findings—and more flexible—because it involves a case-

255. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“It is not within our constitutional
tradition to enact laws of this sort.”).
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by-case assessment of the validity of all classifications of persons on the
basis of status or identity (social group classifications) versus conduct.256
C. The Doctrinal Significance of Animus
Finally, the Court’s animus jurisprudence to date has created
considerable confusion over the doctrinal significance of a finding of
animus. Some cases suggest that while animus itself is not a legitimate
state interest, the presence of other, credible legitimate state interests might
save a law. Theorists have offered that invoking animus is nothing more
than a way for the Court to treat sexual orientation as a suspect
classification without admitting that this is what it is doing.257 Perhaps the
most mainstream theory of animus is that it is nothing more than a trigger
for the mythical creature of “heightened rational basis review.”258 For
example, in concurring with the outcome in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor
characterized animus as “a desire to harm a politically unpopular group,”
and asserted that in cases where animus was present, the Court had then
“applied a more searching form of rational basis review.”259 Under this
theory, the real doctrinal power of animus is that it triggers a form of
heightened scrutiny.
There are several problems with this approach. First, like the “fit of
spite” conception, it rests on an amorphous and incomplete understanding
of animus. Further, understanding animus as nothing more than a gateway
to “heightened rational basis review” perpetuates the unjustified fixation on
levels of scrutiny in equal protection jurisprudence. As others have noted,
this fixation on levels of scrutiny actually shortcuts nuanced, substantive
assessment about what sort of laws are fair or unfair, and why. In addition,
the Court has never acknowledged that it applies “heightened rational basis
review” in certain cases, and it is difficult to imagine the incentive for
adding yet another level of scrutiny to an already dubious doctrinal
taxonomy.

256. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428–29
(1994) (discussing the anticaste principle in relation to race and gender).
257. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 89, 93 (1997) (asserting that gays ought to be recognized as a suspect class
but that Bowers v. Hardwick was “the principal doctrinal obstacle to this conclusion”).
258. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the effect
of a finding of animus was to trigger “a more searching form of rational basis review”);
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144 (U.S. July 30, 2012)
(asserting that when legislation singles out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal
status, even when analyzing the law under rational basis review, a court insists on knowing
the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained, so that it may
determine whether the law exists to further a proper legislative end or simply to put the class
at a disadvantage); Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2004).
259. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580.
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Finally, this view is problematic because it suggests that a court could
find that a law was based in animus, but nevertheless conclude that the law
satisfied so-called “heightened rational basis review.” This would put the
courts in the position of validating laws animated by purpose fundamentally
at odds with the values of the Equal Protection Clause.
In reality, when the Court identifies evidence of animus, it discredits the
other purported state interests, regardless of whether they are legitimate on
a superficial level. Thus, animus acts as a doctrinal silver bullet. This is
appropriate, because if animus is, indeed, constitutionally impermissible, no
law found to be based in animus should be permitted to stand.
IV. ANIMUS GOING FORWARD
The doctrine of unconstitutional animus has lain dormant in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence since its 1996 decision in Romer, but it appears
primed to make an appearance. In particular, animus has been discussed in
a number of lower court cases dealing with the issue of same-sex
marriage—most notably in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry, in which a
certiorari petition is pending at the time of this writing. If the Court grants
certiorari in Perry, the Court will have the opportunity to make a critical
pronouncement on animus. If the Court denies certiorari in Perry, then the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of animus will likely be considered the
authoritative interpretation by lower courts going forward. And this is
problematic, because the Ninth Circuits characterization of animus does not
represent the totality of the doctrine as explored in the Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence. In particular, the primary feature of the
Ninth Circuit decision is that it grounds itself almost entirely in the doctrine
of animus as articulated in Romer, which is not the most clear or the most
vigorous of the Court’s animus cases. As a result, Perry offers a rather thin
understanding of animus that does not account for the larger animus
tradition.
Thus, the main risk the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry poses (a risk
potentially exacerbated if the Supreme Court hears the case and affirms it
on similar grounds) is that the Perry decision understands animus too
narrowly, ignoring the more vigorous understanding of animus presented in
the totality of the Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence.260 The Ninth
Circuit did not purport to present a comprehensive rule for animus; rather, it
only sought to identify animus on the facts of the case before it. But it is
possible that state courts, lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court
would reject other types of animus claims in future cases by distinguishing
those cases from Perry. And that would be wrong.
260. Indeed, a federal district court subsequently declined to apply the animus holding
form Perry to the same-sex marriage ban before it, distinguishing Perry on its facts. See
Jackson v. Abercrombie, No. 11-00734, 2012 WL 3255201, at *18–21 (D. Haw. Aug. 8,
2012).
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Unfortunately, this turn of events has already taken place. A few months
after Perry was issued, the federal district court in Hawaii issued its
decision in Jackson v. Abercrombie.261 That case involved a challenge to
Hawaii’s marriage laws, which provide reciprocal beneficiary benefits but
purposefully exclude same-sex couples from the definition of marriage.
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s clear statement that animus was not confined to
“spite,” the federal district court in Hawaii read the Perry decision
differently. First, the court concluded that Perry was inapposite as a whole
because Hawaii’s prohibition on same-sex marriage did not function to
“take away” existing rights, as Proposition 8 did.262 Indeed, Hawaii had
never granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, so there was nothing to
take away.263 This factual difference between the challenged laws was
sufficient to make the Perry decision irrelevant.
Second, the district court determined that Romer also did not apply
because, while Amendment 2 was concededly a law “of unusual character,”
this could not be said of Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban, as such bans
were widespread and typical:
In Romer, the Supreme Court explained that the “disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law
[was] unprecedented.” The Supreme Court found the absence of
precedent for Amendment 2 instructive; “[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether
they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.” Here, in contrast, the
definition of marriage as a union between a man and woman is not
without precedent or unusual. In fact, it is the historically and
traditionally understood definition; while marriages between same-sex
couples was first allowed by a state in 2004 and since then, only by a
minority of states.264

The district court did not consider other aspects of the animus doctrine, or
the articulation of animus in other cases. Further, the court insinuated that
it would find animus only in cases where the legislature or the populace
acted “absurdly, ignorantly, or with bigotry”265—a contention that directly
conflicts with Perry’s instruction (based on the Supreme Court’s own
animus jurisprudence) that animus can be grounded in much milder
sentiments, including stereotype and disapproval.266
261. See id. at *18–21.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *22.
264. Id. (citations omitted). This is a good demonstration of why the Romer rule is so
weak. It assesses animus by reference to convention—it is not a powerful tool in identifying
contemporary prejudices.
265. Id.
266. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144
(U.S. July 30, 2012) (noting “[t]he ‘inference’ that Proposition 8 was born of disapproval of
gays and lesbians is heightened by evidence of the context in which the measure was passed”
such as the district court’s finding “that ‘[t]he campaign to pass Proposition 8 relied on
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A. Animus and the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Perry
The Ninth Circuit repeatedly emphasized that it was addressing a narrow
issue in its decision: whether the Equal Protection Clause permitted a state
(here represented by the people operating through the referendum process)
to enact a law the sole purpose of which was to deprive a designated group
of rights that they previously possessed.267 The court bluntly stated that it
was not deciding the broader question of whether states could bar same-sex
couples from marriage in other ways without running afoul of federal equal
protection principles.268
There are good reasons why the Ninth Circuit decided Perry on narrow
grounds.269 First, limiting the decision to the particular facts presented in
California arguably made the decision irrelevant to other jurisdictions,
decreasing the chance that the United States Supreme Court would grant
certiorari review. Second, by limiting the implications of the decision, the
Ninth Circuit panel also may have lessened the chances of reversal were the
Court to grant cert. Third, and most appropriate, confining the decision to
the narrowest possible grounds was an act of judicial restraint.
But resting the decision on narrow legal and factual grounds did not
necessarily require the Ninth Circuit to articulate such an excessively
narrow view of the doctrine of unconstitutional animus. The court could
have acknowledged that animus could be found in other types of laws,
while emphasizing that the extraordinary legal mechanism before it was a
clear example of such impermissible laws.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is a case study in the rhetoric of judicial
constraint, which was motivated by several factors. The first form of
constraint was the necessity of framing the issue before the court as
narrowly as possible, in recognition of the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance. The court was further constrained by the state supreme court’s
factual findings regarding the nature, scope, and effect of Proposition 8. In
addition, the Ninth Circuit was constrained by the federal district court’s
findings of fact, which the appellate court could reconsider only in the case
of clear error. Finally, the court was also constrained by Supreme Court
precedent—most significantly, the Court’s decision in Romer.
The Ninth Circuit’s devotion to Romer is problematic because, as
demonstrated above, Romer is the most compromised and unhelpful of the
Court’s animus cases. The Romer Court presumably could have relied on
direct evidence of private biases, and could have invalidated Amendment 2
stereotypes to show that same-sex relationships are inferior to opposite-sex relationships.’”)
(citations omitted).
267. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064.
268. Id. at 1083.
269. See William Eskridge, The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitutional
Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012) (crediting the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Perry as conforming with ideals of judicial minimalism and respect for
the democratic evolution of views on same-sex marriage).
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on that basis, a la Palmore. But because Bowers emphatically stood for the
proposition that stigmatizing gays was acceptable, Romer drew attention
away from this substantive objection and instead inferred animus from a
dubious structural analysis.
Thus, in mimicking Romer, the Ninth Circuit’s first step in addressing the
animus argument was to carefully describe the precise effect of the
challenged law.270 Why? Because of the various ways one might describe
the Supreme Court’s holding in Romer, it is at heart a structural analysis of
unconstitutional animus. That is, the Romer Court looked to the structure
rather than the content of the challenged law to infer that it was based on
animus. Specifically, the Romer Court focused on the relationship between
the broad rights-deprivation worked by Colorado’s Amendment 2 and the
relatively flimsy justifications offered for the law. And the Ninth Circuit
conducted this same kind of analysis.
As discussed above, the exact scope and impact of Proposition 8 were
issues that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the federal district court had to
decide. This is because the California Supreme Court had authoritatively
interpreted the question back in 2009. Nonetheless, when restating that
holding and further characterizing the law, the Ninth Circuit chose its words
carefully. Most dramatically, Proposition 8 “stripped”271 same-sex couples
of the marriage right; it “deprived,”272 “eliminat[ed],”273 “took . . .
away,”274 “excise[d],” 275“den[ied]”276 and “withdr[ew].”277 As with
Colorado’s Amendment 2, the proponents of Proposition 8 contended that
the law did not deprive the targeted group of rights, but merely restored the
status quo. In Perry, as in Romer, showing how the law actively deprived
individuals of rights they previously enjoyed was critical to contending that
this rights-deprivation was not justified.
The relevant inquiry in Romer was not whether the state of the law after
Amendment 2 was constitutional; there was no doubt that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require antidiscrimination protections to be afforded to
gays and lesbians. The question, instead, was whether the change in the
law that Amendment 2 effected could be justified by some legitimate
purpose.278
In addition to demonstrating that Proposition 8 worked an affirmative
and dramatic change in legal rights, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the law’s
focus on depriving same-sex couples of the symbolic meaning and social

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See id. at 1076–82.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1069 n.4.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1083 (emphasis omitted).
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status associated with the term “marriage.”279 The court pointed to all of
the marriage-like rights that same-sex couples retained after the passage of
Proposition 8—rights related to children, medical decisions, and joint
property.280 Thus, what Proposition 8 accomplished was exceedingly
narrow, but not insignificant, because of the profound and unique meaning
of the word and designation, “marriage.”281 By emphasizing that extremely
limited scope of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit departed from the Supreme
Court’s approach in Romer, which emphasized the broad impact of
Colorado’s Amendment 2. But the Ninth Circuit explained that both
modalities—deprivation of a broad swath of rights and extremely targeted
denial of a highly cherished right—served to arouse suspicions that the law
was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”282
Having characterized the impact of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit went
on to discuss the Romer decision at some length, and then examined the
similarities and differences between the laws at issue in each case. The
primary similarity between the two laws is that they singled out a particular
group and denied to that group rights that were broadly available to
others.283 The laws did not reflect real differences; rather, they created
class distinctions by placing the targeted group “in a solitary class” with
respect to important rights.284 Further, this act of purposeful differentiation
was enshrined in legal bedrock: the state constitution.
The court emphasized that it was not that states could never take away
rights once granted, but that “the Equal Protection Clause requires the state
to have a legitimate reason for withdrawing a right or benefit from one
group but not others.”285 Here, the court appropriately drew an analogy to
Moreno. Surely the “hippies” targeted in that case had no general right to
demand food stamp entitlements, but once included in the scope of the
legislation, the government had to give a reason for then deciding to
purposefully exclude the group. The idea is that while the government need
not extend certain benefits to unpopular groups in the first place, the law
may not be used as a vehicle for retribution against such groups.
Having concluded that the fundamental mechanism of Proposition 8
supported an inference of animus, the Ninth Circuit next examined
whether a legitimate interest exists that justifies the People of California’s
action in taking away from same-sex couples the right to use the official
designation and enjoy the status of “marriage”—a legitimate interest that

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id. at 1080.
See id. at 1080–81.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1083–84.
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suffices to overcome the “inevitable inference” of animus to which
Proposition 8’s discriminatory effects otherwise give rise.286

The court found the proffered interests lacking.287
The court then went on to consider whether there might be other bases on
which Californians had enacted the law. The court noted that the law
functioned to preserve tradition (i.e., the tradition of exclusively
heterosexual marriage), but that “tradition alone is not a justification for
taking away a right that had already been granted.”288
Concluding that there was no independent legitimate interest that
Proposition 8 served, the court returned to “the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward” or even mere
disapproval of the targeted group.289 Here the court emphasized that it need
not conclude that people of California operated on the basis of ill will or
spite. Indeed, animus of the type discussed here really means “[p]rejudice,”
which “rises not from malice or hostile animus alone.”290 In a similar vein,
the court noted that unconstitutional animus does not necessarily mean a
“desire to harm”—“basic disapproval of a class of people” is sufficient.291
The court emphasized that the disapproval expressed by Proposition 8
was “of gays and lesbians as a class.”292 The court thereby drew on a
status-conduct distinction: “It will not do to say that Proposition 8 was
intended only to disapprove of same-sex marriage, rather than to pass
judgment on same-sex couples as people.”293 In brief, private individuals
are free to disapprove of classes of persons because of who they are, but
they cannot use the public laws to enforce and express such disapproval.
It was not until the last few pages of the opinion that the court addressed
the abundant direct record evidence of unconstitutional animus surrounding
the Proposition 8 campaign. The court concluded by responding to Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Romer, ruling that the plaintiffs here did not need to
prove that the People of California passed Proposition 8 out of a “fit of
286. Id. at 1085.
287. In keeping with its practice of avoiding controversial questions where possible, the
Ninth Circuit declined to directly address whether “protecting religious liberty” was
substantively a legitimate state interest, as opposed to just another name for impermissible
private bias. The court again turned to the tailoring prong of rational basis review and
concluded that there was no evidence that religious liberty was threatened before the passage
of Proposition 8 or protected after its enactment. Id. at 1091–92.
288. Id. at 1092 (emphasis omitted). Again, focus on withdrawing previously granted
rights seems excessive and possibly limiting. Tradition did not validate antimiscegenation
laws in Loving, despite the fact that the law in Virginia had never affirmatively conferred a
right to interracial marriage. Similarly, preserving tradition was deemed an insufficient basis
for legislation in Lawrence v. Texas, where, again, there was no reversal of rights as
presented in the Perry case. The Perry decision cites both of these cases. See id. at 1093.
289. Id. at 1080.
290. Id. at 1093 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
291. Id. at 1094.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1093.
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spite.”294 Rather, “[i]t is enough to say that Proposition 8 operates with no
apparent purpose but to impose on gays and lesbians, through the public
law, a majority’s private disapproval of them.”295
The substantive outcome of the court’s analysis was to suspect the
presence of animus where a law took away rights that had previously been
granted, thus focusing on (and seemingly requiring) a change in the law
over time. Once this suspicion was raised, the court then demanded that the
governmental interests purportedly served by the law justify not just
reliance on the subject classification (the usual tailoring inquiry under
rational basis review), but the rights deprivation itself.296 This approach to
the animus analysis is interesting, but it hangs other animus cases out to
dry. Given that Proposition 8 (1) objectively functioned to differentially
distribute legal rights among social groups, and (2) was enacted in a cloud
of antigay bias, it should have been easy for the Ninth Circuit, following
Cleburne, to identify unconstitutional animus.
B. The Next Cases
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry accords with much of the Supreme
Court’s animus jurisprudence, but it overanalyzes what is really a very
clear-cut case of direct evidence of animus. In other words, the abundant
evidence of antigay sentiment surrounding the campaign for Proposition 8
should have sufficed to prove that the law was based on unconstitutional
animus (as in Moreno, Palmore and Cleburne).
The court arguably took this indirect route because of its excessive
reliance on Romer, which is the most compromised and constrained animus
case decided by the Supreme Court for the reasons cited above. Because
Bowers was still good law at the time Romer was decided, Romer could not
come out and say that antigay bias in particular was impermissible. Rather,
Romer made much vaguer assertions about the impermissibility of certain
types of laws, and then fit Amendment 2 into that ill-defined category.
Romer was rightly decided, but it would have been decided through
different reasoning had it been decided after Lawrence.
It is important to recognize the limited understanding of animus that
Perry illustrates, because this limited understanding will not provide proper
guidance in the same-sex marriage cases set in a different factual posture
than Perry. Perry essentially understands animus as the granting and
subsequent withdrawal of a right; and while this does seem to be evidence
clearly supporting an inference of animus, this type of evidence will not
necessarily be present in cases arising from other jurisdictions. However,
this is not of great concern to potential litigants, because such evidence is

294. Id. at 1095.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1093–94.
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not required. All that is required is the type of affirmative evidence of
private bias that was present in Moreno, Palmore, Cleburne and Lawrence.
CONCLUSION
Animus means not only “hostility,” but also “animating spirit.” We see
that the Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence patrols all state action
relying on status-based classifications for an impermissible animating spirit.
This general suspicion of class-based legislation has been somewhat lost in
the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework. In particular, many of the
foundational cases in equal protection jurisprudence exhibit a profound
suspicion of class-based legislation, especially where such classifications
tend to create or enforce castes—legally sanctioned differences between
social groups. But the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework subjects the
majority of class-based legislation to the minimal scrutiny associated with
rational basis review, gutting the principled and ambitious political vision
of the Equal Protection Clause.
In contrast to the rigid, backward-looking suspect classification inquiry,
the animus inquiry is flexible and responsive to contemporary prejudices. It
provides meaningful review of laws that do not implicate established
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. Probably the best example is
found in Moreno. The targets of congressional ill will in that case were
“hippies”—a group that did not bear any of the indicia of a classic suspect
classification and a group which many would argue were justifiably
marginalized due to their belief system and lifestyle. This did not mean,
however, that it was permissible to use the law to permanently enshrine that
social marginalization. Laws that tend to create a caste society degrade our
democracy and all of us.
This conception of animus is powerful because it takes us away from
making tenuous social judgments about whether certain groups are
sufficiently marginalized to merit special consideration under the Equal
Protection Clause, or whether the marginalization of a group is justified.
Instead, the animus inquiry asks whether a law impermissibly gives effect
to—indeed, expresses—stereotypes or biases about a particular social group
based on that group’s status or associations rather than individual conduct.
The question in an animus case is not whether the animus is justified; it is
merely whether animus exists.

